The Compensation of Conscience
Markets are often lauded for their efficiency, but Nora Szech’s research shows that individuals are more likely to act against their moral convictions in market contexts. Markets may insulate one from the moral demands of Adam Smith’s impartial spectator, severing the link between personal responsibility and the moral outcomes of one’s actions. Drawing on the literature of compensating wage differentials, we aim to quantify the price of conscience in labor market transactions. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) and Occupational Information Network (O*NET), we estimate the wage effects of occupations that varyingly require workers to act against their sense of right and wrong. Our longitudinal fixed-effects analysis shows that jobs demanding greater compromise of one’s conscience offer higher wages, indicating a compensating differential for the burdening of conscience. This premium appears to increase with education and age, suggesting that experienced and educated workers require a higher price for the compromise of conscience. These findings extend Szech’s experimental evidence on morals and markets to real-world labor markets, showing that the moral costs of market participation find their way into prices. As workers are paid more for compromising their convictions, markets may incentivize individuals to accept roles they otherwise find objectionable, aligning with Szech’s research on how markets erode moral convictions and with Adam Smith’s foundational observations on the compensation of dishonor and disgrace in labor markets.